I. INTRODUCTION
Is the "death knell" of class arbitration found in the fine print? In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court potentially allowed for the evisceration of class arbitration, and indeed most class actions, in consumer and employment settings where contracts contain a pre-dispute arbitration provision that only authorizes claims brought in an individual capacity or that expressly bans representative class actions in arbitration or court ("class action waivers"). No. 184, at *11-12 (Jan. 3, 2012) (distinguishing Concepcion in a case involving an agreement between employers and employees). The term "class action waiver" is also used to describe contractual provisions that require individual arbitration and that prohibit representative actions whether in a judicial proceeding or arbitration. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting language from Cingular's contract prohibiting any form of class proceeding). Some might object that the term "waiver," defined as an intentional relinquishment of a known right, is euphemistically applied, but the term "class action waiver" has taken hold and is commonly used. See, e.g., Olmstead v. Dell, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1015-18 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (using the term "class action waiver" throughout the opinion to refer to a similar provision). Not only do these contracts require individual arbitration, relieving one of the right to go to court, many arbitration provisions now contain a class arbitration waiver that bars individuals from bringing representative claims in court or arbitration at all. See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (providing for both binding arbitration of any claim as well as requiring claims be brought individually); Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 980 (same); Olmstead, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 (same).
demise of class arbitration in holding that parties to an arbitration contract cannot be compelled to class-wide arbitration absent agreement to that process. 10 Since silence appeared to provide an escape from class arbitration under Stolt-Nielsen, express bans on class actions or arbitration only seemed to run the risk of being struck down under state law as unconscionable or contrary to public policy. But as Stolt-Nielsen did not foreclose class arbitration, what of contractual provisions that ban class relief altogether?
The debate over the enforceability of class action waivers, which had been percolating for years in both state and federal courts, came to the forefront in Concepcion when the Court agreed to review application of the California Supreme Court's ruling in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, which deemed some class action waivers in adhesion contracts unconscionable, exculpatory, and thus illegal under California law.
11
"The 'principal purpose' of the FAA is to 'ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.'" 12 But section 2 provides for the judicial enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 13 This "savings clause" has long been interpreted as holding arbitration contracts to the standards of generally applicable state contract law, including defenses applicable to any contract, such as fraud, duress, unconscionability, or public policy. 14 Under Discover Bank, many consumer contract class waivers would be struck down as unconscionable, and the case would proceed in class arbitration. 15 In a 5-4 decision, the Concepcion Court stated that California's judicial rule invalidating class action waivers as unconscionable "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress [in the FAA]." 16 Therefore, according to the Court, the FAA preempted the California law. 17 Writing for the 10 18 He characterized class arbitration, by contrast, as "slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass." 19 The majority further asserted that class arbitration, with no effective means of judicial review, imposes higher risks on defendants who are unlikely to "bet the company" on such a process.
20
Even if class proceedings are needed to vindicate small-dollar claims that might otherwise go unredressed, according to the Court, the "States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA." 21 In light of Concepcion, a number of state and federal courts have enforced class action waivers in consumer arbitration contracts over objections that the waivers effectively immunize defendants from liability or violate state law standards of unconscionability or public policy. 22 Considered a "get out of class actions free" card, Concepcion has provided the impetus for the business community to include express class waivers in their contracts. 23 Class actions, which permit one or more parties to assert claims on behalf of similarly situated individuals, have been part of the U.S. legal landscape since 1966 when Congress promulgated Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide for class actions. 24 Class actions are admittedly controversial, viewed by some businesses as "legalized blackmail," 25 yet also regarded as serving an important public function allowing "those who are less powerful to band together-using lawyers as their champions"-to seek redress of grievances that would "go unremedied if each litigant had to fight 18 and threatens the ability of parties in some cases to vindicate their statutory rights. The Article concludes by advocating for a narrow construction of the decision and the guarantee of a procedural option by which rights, which sometimes require collective action, can be meaningfully vindicated.
II. FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, POLICY, AND SCOPE

A. Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration
The regulatory framework for arbitration in the United States is set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925. 30 arbitrability of individual disputes involving federal or state statutory and common law claims and has regarded arbitration as simply "another forum," it has also cautioned that the ability to vindicate substantive rights must not be impaired.
36
The FAA was enacted to reverse then long-standing judicial hostility to private agreements to arbitrate or to ouster courts from jurisdiction. 37 And it did. In a body of arbitration jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has declared the FAA a "national policy favoring arbitration."
38 Corporate America has embraced arbitration not only for the private resolution of disputes with other businesses, but also as the process of choice in dealing with disputes with consumers or employees. Unless those consumers or employees act together. Judicial hostility has arguably transformed into infatuation with arbitration.
39
Unless it is class arbitration. Corporate entities, which seek arbitration as to individuals, generally resist arbitration when pursued by individuals on a class basis, and they complain of the risks, akin to those raised by individual plaintiffs as in Gilmer, of the arbitrariness of one arbitrator's power in a class case. 36. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 n.10 (2002) ("To the extent the Court of Appeals construed an employee's agreement to submit his claims to an arbitral forum as a waiver of the substantive statutory prerogative of the EEOC to enforce those claims for whatever relief and in whatever forum the EEOC sees fit, the court obscured this crucial distinction and ran afoul of our precedent."); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.").
37. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (explaining that the FAA's "purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts"); cf. 
B. Federal Arbitration Law and Class Actions
The FAA, in text a relatively simple procedural statute that provides for the enforcement of valid arbitration contracts, is silent on any treatment of class actions or class relief. 41 Modern class actions have been a vital procedural option for aggregate party litigation claims since adopted in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966. 42 The question of the interplay between class actions and arbitration came before the Supreme Court indirectly in the early 1980s in Southland. 43 Southland involved a class action initially filed in state court by franchisees of 7-Eleven stores in California. 44 The defendant petitioned to compel arbitration, and the plaintiffs sought class status in arbitration. 45 The California Supreme Court denied arbitration, ruling that the state statute required judicial consideration of franchise disputes. 46 The court, nevertheless, also addressed the concept of classwide arbitration, expressing concerns over class waivers and recognizing class arbitration as a viable option akin to consolidated judicial proceedings. 47 On the preemption issue, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding the FAA preempted the conflicting state law. 48 Regarding the question of "superimposing class action procedures on a contract arbitration," 49 the Court recognized that class arbitration was permissible under California state law.
50
Concluding that a federal question was not involved, the U.S. Supreme Court determined it lacked jurisdiction to address whether the FAA bars class action arbitration. in Bazzle contained a standard arbitration clause but appeared silent as to class actions. 53 The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the case could proceed in class arbitration, reasoning that such a process effectuated both the arbitration agreement and operative state consumer protection law, which allowed class claims. 54 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, in a plurality decision (Justices Breyer, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg) concluded that the FAA required the arbitrator to determine "whether the arbitration contracts forbid class arbitration." 55 PostBazzle, courts and arbitration providers presumed that arbitrators were to interpret arbitration contracts to determine the parties' intent regarding class arbitration and that, implicitly, class-wide arbitration was a viable procedure under the FAA.
56
In 2010, the Court's sentiment toward class arbitration appeared to take a sharp turn in Stolt-Nielsen.
57 Seemingly similar to Bazzle, the underlying arbitration agreement in Stolt-Nielsen was silent on the issue of class arbitration. 58 On the basis that the agreement did not preclude class arbitration, the arbitration panel ordered class arbitration. 59 Writing for the 5-3 majority, Justice Alito (joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) seemingly departed from Bazzle and held that arbitrators exceeded their authority or acted in manifest disregard in imposing class arbitration absent an (express) agreement by the parties to allow class arbitration. 444. The court also acknowledged that to interpret silence as a ban on class actions in arbitration would allow the drafting party to "effectively prevent class actions against it without having to say it was doing so in the agreement" and that express bans on class-wide arbitration would "undermine[] principles favoring expeditious and equitable case disposition." Id. at 360 & n.21 ("Under those circumstances, parties with nominal individual claims, but significant collective claims, would be left with no avenue for relief and the drafting party with no check on its abuses of the law.").
55. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453-54 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (stating that the FAA did not preclude a state court from authorizing class arbitration).
56. opinion, the Court proceeded to critique class arbitrations and described "just some of the fundamental" differences between bilateral and class arbitrations as "too great for arbitrators to presume."
61
After Stolt-Nielsen, a contract silent on arbitration could not be construed to authorize class arbitration absent extrinsic evidence authorizing such. Meanwhile, lawsuits challenging the enforceability of "express bans" on class actions or "class action waivers" in arbitration contracts continued to mount in the lower state and federal courts. 62 Courts had largely divided on whether the class waivers were to be enforced "according to their terms" pursuant to the FAA's command, or were subject to scrutiny under state contract law. The California Supreme Court's rule on class waivers was made clear through a decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, which held a class action waiver, specifically in adhesion consumer contracts involving small amounts of damages and imposed by a party with superior bargaining power, unconscionable. tax.
67
The Concepcions filed a complaint that was eventually consolidated with a class action lawsuit against AT&T in federal court in California alleging false advertising and fraud. 68 AT&T moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision in the purchase and sale contract. 69 The arbitration clause required that claims be brought in an "individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding." 70 The contract also provided for an informal dispute-resolution process whereby customers could complete a one-page form available on AT&T's website. 71 If the dispute was not resolved within thirty days, then the customer had the option of small claims court or arbitration. 72 Pursuant to the provision, arbitration would take place in the county in which the customer was billed, and AT&T agreed to pay all costs for non-frivolous claims and not seek reimbursement for its attorney fees. 73 Further, if the Concepcions received an award larger than AT&T's last settlement offer, AT&T would pay a guaranteed minimum recovery of $7,500 and double the attorney's fees. 74 The plaintiffs opposed the motion to compel arbitration, alleging it was unlawful and exculpatory based on California law.
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B. Lower Court Rulings
Although the district court acknowledged that AT&T's informal dispute resolution process was "quick, [and] easy to use," it denied AT&T's motion to compel. 76 The district court found the arbitration provision unconscionable under California law "because AT&T had not 67 [b] ecause class actions are so intimately linked to the vindication of substantive rights, the Court should not have unilaterally made a policy decision as to when the use of class proceedings is appropriate"). Businesses, on the other hand, praised the decision, with AT&T stating that "its arbitration program is 'free, fair, easy to use and consumer friendly.'" Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Says Arbitration Agreements Can Ban Class-Action Efforts, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-says-arbitration-the case certainly affirms the Court's deference to arbitration and reluctance to recognize exceptions to the presumption of arbitral enforceability. The Court's perception is that arbitration is quick, informal, and cheap, but that, based on reports from the commercial arbitration community, class arbitration does not align with these ideals. 100 The majority's argument that class actions are ill-suited for arbitration because of the high stakes involved, the limited review of the FAA, and the attendant increased risks to employers, were all raised as concerns by the plaintiff in the Gilmer case, yet the Gilmer Court rejected them. 101 The Court sent a mixed message that arbitration with its limited review is fine for fundamental individual rights, but not for a business entity. Perhaps this case can be distinguished because of the "consumer-friendly" aspects of the AT&T commercial arbitration clause that address consumer interest concerns yet avoid class actions (despite the risk of unconscionability in California). Yet the Court articulated a position, as it did in Stolt-Nielsen, that class arbitration is fundamentally different from bilateral litigation and, thus, contrary to the FAA. 104 The following section describes judicial responses to Concepcion, outlining its application as well as its potential limits.
IV. POST-CONCEPCION: FAA PREEMPTION SCOPE, LIMITS, AND THE FUTURE OF CLASS ARBITRATION
A. Cases Upholding Class Action Waivers Based on FAA Preemption Even If State Law Would Invalidate Such Waivers
After Concepcion, a rubber-stamp effect seemed to ensue in the courts addressing the enforceability of class action waivers in arbitration agreements. Courts largely considered their rulings bound to follow Concepcion, even where state law would invalidate the contractual bans. The Eleventh Circuit, in Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, considered a consumer class action lawsuit against a cell phone company where the underlying agreement contained a class action waiver and requirement for individual arbitration. 105 The plaintiffs there argued that the class action waiver embedded in the arbitration provision frustrated their ability to vindicate their rights under the state deceptive trade practices statute. 106 Although the Cruz court acknowledged that the class action waiver in the consumer arbitration contract would be invalid under state law as contrary to public policy, it determined itself bound, under Concepcion, to enforce the class action waiver and ruled that the FAA preempted the state law, which stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objective of promoting arbitration. 109 In seeking class recognition, the plaintiffs argued that they could only realistically pursue their claims as a class-in arbitration or in court-and that the confidential nature of arbitration on an individualized basis would make it impossible to pursue their claims otherwise. 110 The court conceded that, but for Concepcion, it would have found the arbitration agreement unconscionable.
111 Ruling itself bound to deny plaintiffs' desired relief, the court acknowledged the following:
There is no doubt that Concepcion was a serious blow to consumer class actions and likely foreclosed the possibility of any recovery for many wronged individuals. . . . [T] he Supreme Court considered the fact that the Concepcions and other class plaintiffs would be denied any recovery by its ruling, and ruled against the class plaintiffs nonetheless. 115 The plaintiff argued that enforcement of the class action waiver undermined the purposes and policies of the SCRA, which was designed to protect military service members. 116 The court reasoned that because the SCRA does not address class waivers, and thus does not preclude them, under Concepcion, the arbitration clause in the contract is Litigation, granted a motion to compel individual arbitration of a class action lawsuit after Concepcion where the arbitration agreements at issue between title insurance companies and a consolidated group of policy purchasers were silent as to class arbitration. 118 The court noted that, prior to Concepcion, it would have held the arbitration agreements unconscionable, but after the decision, it must compel arbitration "even in the absence of the opportunity for plaintiffs to bring their claims as a class action." 119 Finally, even motions seeking to compel arbitration brought after Concepcion that would have been futile prior to Concepcion have been granted. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, in Estrella v. Freedom Financial, granted such a motion despite plaintiffs' objections as to waiver because of the defendant's failure to seek an order compelling arbitration during the two years of litigation. 120 The court noted that the defendants did not waive their right to compel arbitration because, prior to Concepcion, they were not acting "inconsistently with a known existing right to compel arbitration." The loan agreement between the consumer-borrower and the lender contained an extensively detailed arbitration agreement typed in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS (also known as screaming) that excluded class actions. Id. at 1342-43. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated, inter alia, the state deceptive trade practices act and Truth in Lending Act. Id. at 1342. In holding the class action waiver enforceable, the court noted that the waiver was clear, and under the standards established in Concepcion, the agreement was not unconscionable. Id. at 1348.
California Courts Conflicted on When to Enforce Class Action Waivers
Although the Supreme Court held that the California Supreme Court's Discover Bank rule invalidating class action waivers was preempted under the FAA, California lower courts continue to struggle with enforcing class action waivers and have found circumstances in which to distinguish Concepcion. In Brown, an employee filed a class and representative action under PAGA, alleging violations under the state Labor Code.
124
The defendant-employer sought to compel individual arbitration pursuant to the arbitration policy, which also excluded class actions. 125 The court rejected the claim that the waiver was unconscionable after Concepcion; however, it held the waiver was not effective as to precluding the employee's right to pursue a representative claim under PAGA. 126 The court stated that " [Concepcion] does not purport to deal with the FAA's possible preemption of contractual efforts to eliminate representative private attorney general actions to enforce the Labor Code. . . . PAGA creates a statutory right for civil penalties for Labor Code violations 'that otherwise would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies. '" 127 The court likened the aggrieved employee's role to that of a proxy or agent of state labor law enforcement agencies.
128
In contrast to Concepcion, which involved waiving the private right of an individual, Brown involved a non-waivable public right. suit under federal anti-discrimination laws, 130 private citizens are "deputized" as private attorneys general to bring representative actions as a means of public enforcement of the state's labor code. 131 Ultimately, the court held that a private contractual agreement-the arbitration agreement-cannot serve to contravene a publicly established law.
b. Public Injunctive Relief
The exception for PAGA claims under Brown is not universally accepted by the California courts. For example, the plaintiff in Nelson v. AT&T Mobility LLC sought to distinguish Concepcion by filing a class action lawsuit seeking public injunctive relief under California's unfair competition law and Consumers Legal Remedies Act and by invoking the analogy to the decisions exempting PAGA claims. 133 Despite the plaintiff's claim that seeking to enforce public rights would not conflict with the FAA, the court enforced the arbitration clause with a class action waiver. 134 Similarly, the court, in Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, upheld an arbitral class waiver even though the plaintiff argued that enforcing the class waiver would prevent him from vindicating claims for public injunctive relief under state law, reasoning that state law could not prohibit arbitrating particular claims. continued to apply unconscionability as a general defense to test an arbitration contract's validity.
138
The court, in Kanbar v. O'Melveny & Myers, found the Dispute Resolution Program provisions in an individual and class employment discrimination claim unconscionable. 139 The provisions included: (a) a one-year claim-filing notice period, which essentially shortened the statute of limitations for employment-related claims; (b) a confidentiality clause that prohibited any employee from assisting in another employee's case; (c) an exemption for the employer from arbitration; and (d) a bar on claims to administrative agencies, other than discrimination claims to the EEOC or a comparable state agency. 140 Rejecting that the FAA preempts its unconscionability determination, the court reasoned that a rule is anti-arbitration if it "interferes with [the] fundamental attributes of arbitration"-in particular, its informality, expeditiousness, and relative inexpensiveness.
141 Thus, state unconscionability may still serve to invalidate arbitration agreements because, as long as the invalidation does not interfere with the fundamental attributes of arbitration, it will not conflict with Concepcion and, thus, will not be subject to preemption under the FAA.
142
Arbitration provisions that include class waivers have also been invalidated by standard contract defenses, such as lack of mutual assent, where the provision was too vague to provide adequate notice. 143 The court noted that the substantive nature of the plaintiff's Title VII pattern or practice discrimination claim could only be pursued on a class basis. 147 The substantive right was not the right to proceed on a class basis, but rather the right to vindicate a claim. 148 On the grounds that "an arbitration provision [that] 'precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights' is unenforceable," the court held that Concepcion was not applicable to federal statutory claims that can only be vindicated on a class basis. enforce claims of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 151 The plaintiff had filed a putative class action under FLSA, alleging the defendantemployer wrongfully classified her as exempt from the overtime requirements of FLSA.
152
The court had previously denied the defendant's motion to dismiss based on the class waiver, finding that "[t]he record supports [the plaintiff's] argument that [pursuant to the Agreement] her maximum potential recovery would be too meager to justify the expenses required for the individual prosecution of her claim." 153 The defendant sought reconsideration of the court's ruling that the class waiver was invalid because it deprived plaintiff of the ability to vindicate her rights, asserting that the new law under Concepcion compelled reversal. 154 In adhering to the original ruling, Judge Wood emphasized the plaintiff's inability to "vindicate her rights absent a collective action," as opposed to the Concepcions' ability to vindicate their claims under AT&T's customer-friendly dispute resolution policy. 155 Judge Wood stated, "[i]n contrast to the facts in Concepcion, [the plaintiff] has demonstrated that she would not be able to obtain representation or vindicate her rights on an individual basis."
156 Judge Wood further cited Supreme Court jurisprudence in which the Court had stated "that it may not enforce contractual agreements that would operate 'as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies.'" 157 The Sutherland decision importantly notes the following:
The enforceability of a class action waiver must be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances including, but not limited to, "the fairness of the provisions, the cost to an individual plaintiff of vindicating the claim when compared to the plaintiff's potential recovery, the ability to recover attorneys' fees and other costs and thus obtain legal representation to prosecute the underlying claim." 158 
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Applying these criteria, Judge Wood determined that the plaintiff could not vindicate her statutory rights in an individual arbitration. 159 Thus, arbitration agreements that alter or preclude parties from enforcement of federal statutory rights may be outside the purview of Concepcion. Yet, the facts of future cases may find vindication of rights possible. Such was the case in D'Antuono v. Service Road Corp., in which the court stayed a FLSA collective action because the plaintiffs had signed arbitration agreements containing class waivers and asserted that the class waiver did not prevent them from vindicating their FLSA rights. 160 This issue remains unsettled in the wake of Concepcion.
c. National Labor Relations Act
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) relied upon federal labor law in invalidating a class action waiver in In re D.R. Horton, Inc. 161 In January 2012, the three-member panel ruled that class action waivers in employment agreements violate section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which guarantees employees the "right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid or protection" 162 and prohibits employers from interfering with those protected rights. 163 The employer in D.R. Horton required its employees nationwide to sign a "Mutual Arbitration Agreement" (MAA) as a condition of employment with the company. 164 The MAA required that all company employees agree to forfeit the right to any form of class action claims and that all individual disputes with the company be submitted for binding arbitration. 165 In 2008, several similarly situated employees sought to initiate class arbitration, alleging the employer violated the NLRA by requiring the MAA as a condition of employment. 166 The NLRB held that employers violate section 7 of the NLRA-the right of employees to engage in concerted action for mutual aid or protection-when they require the employee, as a condition of employment, to sign an agreement precluding class action claims-in both judicial and arbitral forums-and requiring all disputes with the employer to be decided in binding arbitration. 172. Courts could be potentially eliminated from the arbitration process altogether, other than at the judicial review stage, by a delegation provision. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777-78, 2781 (2010) (ruling 5-4 that where an arbitration provision delegates gateway questions concerning the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement to arbitrators, unconscionability challenges must be directed to the delegation provision alone, thus ultimately KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
V. LIFE UNDER CONCEPCION
A. Federal Legislative Action
As the Supreme Court's jurisprudence enables broad enforcement of private arbitration contracts, including those that can deny parties rights to collective action and usurp states from administrative action, Congress is increasingly responding to calls for protection against mandatory arbitration in certain sectors.
173 Legislation seeking to limit or invalidate the FAA's application in various areas has been the subject of much congressional attention.
Legislation for a proposed Arbitration Fairness Act has been introduced almost annually over the past five years. In its current version, the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011 would invalidate pre-dispute arbitration contracts in consumer, employment, and civil rights actions. 174 The Arbitration Fairness Act proposal has generated significant controversy among ardent supporters and opponents, and it continues to face obstacles in garnering enough support to be enacted. (2008) (laying out the author's case against the arbitration act and explaining why post-dispute arbitration is not a viable alternative to the current use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses); Weston, supra note 30, at 398 (noting that the legislative change proposed in Weston's note and in the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 would "radically change . . . corporate uses of arbitration provisions in contracts with employees, consumers, and franchisees" and that "the supporters of arbitration status quo may be more mobilized to convince federal lawmakers that the FAA is alright as is").
176. See 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2006) ("It shall be unlawful for any creditor to extend consumer credit to a covered member or a dependent of such a member with respect to which . . . the creditor requires the borrower to submit to arbitration or imposes onerous legal notice provisions in the case of a dispute."); § 987(f)(4) ("Notwithstanding section 2 of title 9, or any other Federal or State law, rule, or regulation, no agreement to arbitrate any dispute involving the extension of consumer credit shall be enforceable against any covered member or dependent of such a member, or any person who was a covered member or dependent of that member when the agreement was made.").
opt out of arbitration in contracts involving livestock or poultry under the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008. 177 This protection is similar to that accorded automobile dealers in the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, which requires post-dispute consent to arbitration by all parties. 178 Lastly, in 2009, the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act attempted to restrict mandatory arbitration in nursing home contracts with residents. 179 Congress is also gradually limiting pre-dispute arbitration of statutory disputes in employment. In response to the concerns raised in Jones v. Halliburton, Co., which involved sexual assault claims arising in Iraq by an employee against a military contractor, 180 Congress passed the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, which bars many defense contractors and subcontractors from using pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. 181 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act prohibits pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate certain whistleblower claims brought against public companies and many financial services institutions. 182 
B. Proposed Federal Legislative Action to Address Class Waivers
After Concepcion, the state of class arbitrations and the future of class actions are in a flux. It is appropriate and necessary for Congress to respond by simply amending the FAA to restrict class waivers. The congressional intention to restrict arbitration must be explicit, as the Court is not inclined to imply a conflict between a federal statutory right to sue and the FAA even in an adhesive pre-dispute arbitration KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 agreement. 183 In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court addressed "whether the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA) precludes enforcement of an arbitration agreement in a lawsuit alleging violations of that Act."
184 CROA provides a right to sue for violations under the consumer protection statute. 185 The plaintiffs in CompuCredit sought class status and voidance of the class arbitration waiver, contending that CROA's right to sue disallowed contractual waivers on the right for CROA violations. 186 The Court did not view the arbitration requirement as conflicting with CROA because the statute did not require a judicial forum, and the right to sue could be effectuated through arbitration.
187
VI. CONCLUSION
Concepcion, based on a dated notion of arbitration, improperly guts the FAA savings clause and violates the reserved role under the FAA for states to hold arbitration contracts to the standards required for all contracts. Certainly, the FAA was not intended to shield wrongdoers from liability. That risk, however, is present where class action waivers have the effect of allowing small but widespread illegality claims to go unheard. Perhaps Concepcion will ring louder the calls for legislative reform of the FAA to address concerns of mandatory arbitration. Some rights can only be vindicated through collective action. The public function served by collective action through procedural joinder is too important to be eliminated by the strike of a pen. Consent to arbitration and a meaningful opportunity to vindicate rights need not conflict. 186. 132 S. Ct. at 668-69. 187. Id. at 672-73 ("Because the CROA is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable forum, the [FAA] requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its terms.").
